TRIALOG 82 Urban Mobility Mobilität in der Stadt - Trialog Journal
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TRIALOG 82
Zeitschrift für das
Urban
Planen und Bauen
in der Dritten Welt
Mobility
3 / 2004
Mobilität
in der StadtEditorial Mobilität ist unverzichtbar für den Zusammenhalt der Stadt und für deren
wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Austauschprozesse. Weltweit sind
Mobility is crucial for the cohesion of cities and for their economic, social die schnellwachsenden Städte einem noch schnelleren Zuwachs des
and cultural exchange processes. Fast growing cities around the world motorisierten Verkehrs ausgesetzt. Dabei ist es offensichtlich, dass der
are exposed to an even faster increase in motorised traffic. At the same motorisierte Verkehr das Straßenleben und die Freiraumqualitäten
time, it is evident that motorised traffic hinders street life and affects the beeinträchtigt. Ärmere Stadtviertel sind meist stärker von diesen Neben-
quality of open spaces. Poor neighbourhoods are generally the most wirkungen betroffen (z.B. Lärm, Abgasen etc.) sowie von den Defiziten
affected by the side effects of mobility (e.g. noise, pollution etc.) and by des öffentlichen Transports. Dennoch ist die Verbesserung von Mobilität
the deficiencies of public transportation. Nevertheless, the improvement üblicherweise kein wichtiger Punkt in den Agenden der Entwicklungszu-
of mobility is usually not seen as an important issue in the agendas of sammenarbeit. Das Fachwissen zu Stadtentwicklung ist zudem meist
development co-operation. Furthermore, urban development expertise is strikt getrennt von den Kenntnissen der Verkehrsplanungs-Experten.
often strictly separated from the knowledge of traffic planning experts.
In den letzten Jahren tauchten in einigen lateinamerikanischen Städten
Over the last years, new and surprising approaches have appeared neue überraschende Ansätze auf: es begann mit einem neuen Bussystem
in some Latin American cities, starting with a new bus system in Curití- in Curitíba und gipfelte in der Erfahrung von Bogotá, Kolumbien. Ricardo
ba and culminating in the experience of Bogotá, Colombia. Ricardo Montezuma präsentiert die Entwicklung eines integrierten Stadterneue-
Montezuma documents the development of an integrated urban trans- rungskonzepts in der Zeit der Bürgermeister Peñalosa und Mockus, wel-
formation concept under Bogotá’s mayors Peñalosa and Mockus which ches die Begrenzung des individuellen motorisierten Verkehrs beinhaltet,
included the limitation of individual motorised traffic, a systematic trans- eine systematische Umwandlung der öffentlichen Räume, die Verände-
formation of public space, the change of drivers’ attitudes, the imple- rung der Verhaltensweisen der Autofahrer, die Einrichtung von Fahrrad-
mentation of bicycle paths and – last but not least – the introduction of spuren und – nicht zuletzt – die Einführung eines modernen Schnellbus-
a modern rapid transport system: The Transmilenio. Dario Hidalgo and systems: des Transmilenio. Dario Hidalgo und Gabrielle Hermann
Gabrielle Hermann outline how this “good practice” of Bogotá influenced belegen, wie diese „good practice“ von Bogotá den Entwurf ähnlicher
the design of similar rapid bus lines and traffic concepts in other cities Schnellbussysteme und Verkehrskonzepte in anderen Städten in allen
all over the world – where the concepts nonetheless faced many objec- Teilen der Welt beeinflusste, wo dieses Konzept jedoch vielen Wider-
tions and contradictions. Jakarta is one of the examples, presented by ständen und Widersprüchen ausgesetzt ist. Jakarta ist eines der Bei-
Florian Steinberg, where the Transmilenio system was recently copied spiele, hier vorgestellt von Florian Steinberg, wo das Transmilenio
under the name of “Busway”, but without any reference to other ele- System kürzlich unter dem Namen „Busway“ kopiert wurde, jedoch
ments of Bogotá’s urban transformation. Jürgen Heyen-Perschon and ohne Bezug zu anderen Elementen der urbanen Transformation von
Roelof Wittink introduce new initiatives to promote bicycle traffic in Bogotá. Jürgen Heyen-Perschon und Roelof Wittink präsentieren
developing cities (as in Jinja, Uganda) which also refer to the Bogotá neue Initiativen zur Förderung des Fahrradverkehrs in Städten des
example and are supported by the international LOCOMOTIVES net- Südens, etwa in Jinja, Uganda, die sich ebenso auf das Beispiel Bogotá
work. In contrast, the reality of traffic planning in African or Asian cities beziehen, und die vom weltweiten LOCOMOTIVES - Netzwerk unter-
is still very much linked to individual motorised traffic. Based on her stützt werden. Die Realität der Stadtplanung in afrikanischen oder asia-
experiences working in the local planning department in Kigali, Rwanda, tischen Städten ist dagegen immer noch sehr stark auf den individuel-
German co-operation expert Regina Poth stresses the importance of len motorisierten Verkehr ausgerichtet. Auf dem Erfahrungshintergrund
the self-help capacity of poor inhabitants. The reality of rural accessibili- ihrer Arbeit in einer lokalen Planungsbehörde in Kigali, Ruanda betont
ty problems in Latin Americais outlined by Joaquín Caraballo, who die deutsche Entwicklungsexpertin Regina Poth die Bedeutung der
proposes simple road construction with low maintenance costs based Selbsthilfekapazität armer Stadtbewohner. Die Realität der mangelnden
on concrete blocks. Craig August Johnson refers to cities in Vietnam, Zugänglichkeit ländlicher Gebiete in Lateinamerika wird von Joaquín
where two-wheel motorisation could be compatible with multiple street Caraballo beleuchtet, der einen einfachen, auf Betonsteinen basieren-
uses and the preservation of the urban quality of life. Katrin Driessen den Wegebau mit geringen Unterhaltkosten vorschlägt. Craig August
tells of a GTZ project in Aleppo, Syria, which aims to reduce traffic so Johnson bezieht sich auf die Städte in Vietnam, in denen eine auf
as to improve a historic centre neighbourhood. In response to this vari- Zweiradverkehr konzentrierte Motorisierung mit den vielfältigen Straßen-
ety of developments and experiences, German co-operation recently nutzungen und dem Erhalt der urbanen Lebensqualität kompatibel sein
developed new mobility concepts; these are presented by Manfred könnte. Katrin Driessen beschreibt ein GTZ-Projekt in Aleppo, Syrien,
Breithaupt, Jan A. Schwaab and Armin Wagner. The link between das ein historisches Stadtviertel über Verkehrsverminderung aufzuwer-
modernisation and car traffic development – still quite dominant in the ten versucht. Angesichts dieser neuen Entwicklungen und Erfahrungen
minds of experts and government members in the South – increasingly hat die deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit Leitsätze zur Mobilität
seems to be questioned now in the face of new convincing approaches entwickelt, die hier von den GTZ-Mitarbeitern Manfred Breithaupt, Jan
to urban mobility with non-motorised or bus-based transit alternatives. A. Schwaab und Armin Wagner vorgestellt werden. Der in den Köpfen
von Experten und Regierungsmitgliedern des Südens noch sehr starke
Zusammenhang von Modernisierung und Autoverkehr scheint so zuneh-
mend in Frage gestellt zu werden angesichts neuer überzeugender
Ansätze städtischer Mobilität mit nicht motorisierten oder auf modernen
Bussystemen aufbauenden Verkehrsalternativen.
Antje Wemhöner / Klaus Teschner
2 Tr i a l o g 8 2 / 2 0 0 4TRIALOG 82
A Journal for
Urban
Planning and Building
in the Third World
Mobility
3 / 2004
Mobilität
in der Stadt
List of Contents / Inhalt
4 The transformation of Bogotá 1995-2000
Between the redefinition of space and the citizen
Ricardo Montezuma
11 The Bogotá Model for Sustainable Transportation:
Inspiring Developing Cities throughout the World
Dario Hidalgo and Gabrielle Hermann
16 The “Busway” in Jakarta: a low cost (?)
mass transport system in the making
Florian Steinberg
21 Making the African Cities Mobile: Non-motorized
Transport Solutions in African Cities
The Case of Jinja / Uganda
Jürgen Heyen-Perschon
22 LOCOMOTIVES – Low Cost Mobility Initiatives
Support Program
Roelof Wittink
25 Hilf dir selbst, so hilft dir Gott! –
Wie Bewohner Kigalis ihren Beitrag zur
Verbesserung der Mobilität leisten
Regina Poth
30 Rural Accessibility and Rural Transport in
Latin America
Joaquin Caraballo
34 Streetwise Sustainability: A Two Wheel Alternative
to Balance Motorization and Street Life
Craig August Johnson
39 Verkehrsberuhigung und Verkehrskonzepte
für einen Teil der Altstadt von Aleppo
Kathrin Driessen
43 Zukunftsfähige Mobilität: Ansätze und Erfahrungen
der technischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit
Manfred Breithaupt, Jan A. Schwaab,
Armin Wagner
49 Neue Bücher / Book reviews
54 Aktuelles / News
56 Veranstaltungen / Forthcoming events
Tr i a l o g 8 2 / 2 0 0 4
3The Transformation of Bogotá
1995-2000
Between the redefinition of space
and the citizen
Ricardo Montezuma
Despite the deep economic crisis and violence road infrastructure, especially the implementa-
1 Since the mid-1990’s, con-
struction in Bogotá and Colom-
that Colombia continues to experience, the tion of paths reserved exclusively for bicycles,
bia has undergone a deep cri- spatial, social, political and economic structure the revitalisation of parks, sidewalks, and the
sis. This is the due to the of Bogotá has undergone important changes. implementation of the Transmilenio bus sys-
recession in the Colombian
The administration of Antanas Mockus (1995 - tem. This system, which has improved com-
economy and problems related
to financing. Residential con- 1997 and 2001 - 2003), who proposed a culture muting for 10% of users of public transport,
struction stopped completely at and pedagogy of the citizen, resulted in a con- involves lanes dedicated exclusively to buses,
the end of 2000. centration on the analysis and understanding new buses, and permanent, easily recognis-
2 Ardila A., “Cómo vamos en of problems and programs that made citizens able stops. The Transmilenio was created with
Movilidad Vial” in Cambios en reflect on the importance of changing their men- public (state) organisation of revenue, cen-
la calidad de la vida de la ciu-
tality and behaviour in the urban setting. The tralised control and infrastructure construction,
dad 1998-2000, Casa Editorial
El Tiempo - Fundación Corona administration of Enrique Peñalosa (1998 - 2000) and contracts with private companies. It has
- Cámara de Comercio de was characterised by a high rate of investment made urban transport during peak hours more
Bogotá – Instituto Fes de and the rapid completion of an important num- agile, thereby reducing congestion and aver-
liderazgo, Bogotá, Memorias
del Foro Bogotá cómo vamos ber of infrastructure projects.These projects chal- age commuting time.2 The “pico y placa”
septiembre 25-27 de 2000, p.23 lenged the traditional model of city. (“peak times and license plates”) program
greatly restricts the use of private automobiles
3 See ar ticle: Montezuma, R.,
“La Revolución Cachaca” in The Spatial, Socio-economic and at peak times.
Semana, l9 - 12 January 2001 Political Transformation of Bogotá
Society
4 Londoño, J.L., “Cómo vamos
en educación” in Cambios en Although the changes in Bogotá are most evi- Bogotá has experienced important social
la calidad de la vida de la ciu- dent in spatial terms, the transformation has changes. Coverage of public domestic services
dad 1998-2000, p. 23 affected every dimension of life the city. (water, electricity, telephones and gas) has
5 Between 1994 and 1999, increased and efforts have been made to “de-
homicides fell from 7,144 to Space marginalise the poorest neighbourhoods. The
4,164. “Geografía de las muer- Despite the deep crisis in the construction sec- administration of Enrique Peñalosa, (1998 -
tes violentas en Bogotá” in:
Vivir en Bogotá, n° 2 Septem- tor,1 the following physical aspects of Bogotá 2000) legalised and provided water, electricity
ber 2000, p.3 have changed substantially: pedestrian zones, and paved roads to 316 neighbourhoods, and
invested 1.3 trillion pesos (US $800 million) to
the benefit of 650,000 marginalised persons”.3
Die Umwandlung von Bogota zwischen 1995 und 2000 – neue Konzepte für den Resources doubled for public education and
städtischen Raum und die Bürgerschaft
coverage increased by 30% (140,000 students4).
Trotz der tiefen Krise Kolumbiens haben sich die räumlichen, gesellschaftlichen und poli-
tischen Strukturen in der Hauptstadt Bogota in den vergangen Jahren in wichtigen Aspek-
Regarding safety, the number of violent deaths
ten verbessert. Grundlage dieses Wandels sind einerseits kulturelle und pädagogische fell by 42%.5 This is one of the most important
Maßnahmen unter Bürgermeister Antanus Mockus (1995 - 1997 und 2001 - 2003), die successes of the city, because it was achieved
das Verständnis für (z.B. verkehrsbedingte) Probleme und daran anknüpfende Program- through education, not through repressive poli-
me ermöglichen sollten sowie andererseits eine rasche Umsetzung wichtiger Maßnah- cies of zero tolerance, as seen in other cities,
men zur Infrastrukturverbesserung in der Mandatszeit von Bürgermeister Peñalosa (1998 - such as New York. Further, the first administra-
2000). Diese umfassen die Festlegung von Fußgängerzonen, den Bau von Fuß- und
tion of Antanas Mockus (1995 - 1997) changed
Fahrradwegen, die Einrichtung von Busspuren, die Revitalisierung von Grünflächen und
Parkanlagen und vor allem Vorgaben zur generellen Beschränkung des motorisierten the mentality of the population and created a
Individualverkehrs in der Stadt. Ergänzt wurde dies durch Projekte zur flächendeckenden culture of citizenship, enabling the subsequent
Versorgung der Bevölkerung mit Strom, Wasser, Gas und Telekommunikation sowie zur administration to enforce measures like the
Verbesserung der allgemeinen Sicherheit. obligatory use of seatbelts and the restrictions
on automobiles.
4 Tr i a l o g 8 2 / 2 0 0 4Economy
Revenues and public investment went up under
Mockus and Peñalosa. In the last years of the
1990’s, Bogotá doubled its tax income, credit
qualifications for internal debt improved consid-
erably, and internal debt also doubled. Between
1997 and 2000 total income increased from
1.883 to 3.692 trillion pesos (US $1.255 billion
to US $2.461 billion). The strengthening of
income is the result of an increase in the gaso-
line tax, the application of an anti-evasion
regime, updating information for real estate
Photo 1: Bogota Transmilenio
taxes, simplification of taxes, property assess- (Photo: R. Montezuma)
ment according to infrastructure benefit, and
readjustment of public service tariffs. In addition, best qualified. Their teams were made up of
52% of the budget of the Transmilenio comes a high percentage of young academics and
from the national government over 15 years.6 women, moving from a politically motivated,
Increasing the gasoline tax from 14% to 20% clientelistic scheme a much more ethical and
generated 30000 million pesos (US $20 million) professional way of working. This reduced
annually, providing funds for investment in tran- corruption, increased worker efficiency, and
sit (road networks and public transport). The improved the quality of contracts with the
anti-evasion regime has increased revenues by private sector.
62 billion pesos in 1999 and 70 billion pesos in
2000 (US $ 41 million and US $46 million). The Reflection, 1995-1997: Culture
Updating the real estate taxes increased the and Pedagogy of Citizenship
real estate tax base by 40% in two years. The
municipality received an additional 970 billion On the 30th of October of 1994, Antanas
pesos (US $646 million) by reducing capital in Mockus Sivickas was elected mayor with
the Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de 64% of the votes (492,389), easily defeating
Bogotá (Telecommunications Company of his opponent, Enrique Peñalosa of the Colom-
Bogotá). One of the largest victories of fiscal bian Liberal Party, who received only 30%.
management was the considerable reduction in
functioning costs that provided the municipality Mockus, a Colombian of Lithuanian ancestry,
more money for investment. Until 1994 more was 43 years old when he became Mayor on
than 45% of the municipal budget was used for the first of January 1995. As an academic with
functioning costs, and in 1992 this number was master’s degrees in mathematics and philoso-
52%. Beginning in 1995, this number was phy, he had no experience as a politician. The
reduced and in 1999 it was down to 20%. On premise of his campaign was “No P” – no pub-
the other hand, investment rose from 30% in licity, politics, party, or “plata” (money). This
1992 to 75% in 1999. eccentric campaign was the cheapest ever in
Colombia; it cost a total of US $8,000.
Politics
In the political sphere, the important changes Mockus’ administrations Plan of District Devel-
6 Sandoval, C.A., “Cómo van
took place in the behaviour of the voters and opment for 1995 - 1997, “Formar Ciudad” (Edu- las finanzas distritales” in
elected officials. Voters showed their impa- cate the City) emphasised the following: Cambios en la calidad de la
tience with the traditional political class and vida de la ciudad 1998-2000,
bipartisan politics in municipal elections by – Culture of citizenship p. 211
casting votes for alternative candidates. – Public space 7 Although Jaime Castro was
– Environment successful in legal planning
and tax reform, his plan to
Mockus and Peñalosa found themselves in a – Social progress institute a new transpor t
situation conducive to important changes in the – Urban productivity system did not come to fruiti-
political sphere. The administration prior to – Institutional legitimacy9 on. “Metrobus”, proposed by
Mockus had succeeded in improving the Volvo-stage cóude and the
finance corporation of trans-
finances of the city and most importantly, Mockus defined the culture of citizenship as por t, was similar to the “Auto-
changed the city charter to give more indepen- “the sum of habits, behaviours, actions and bus” in Brazil. The largest
dence to the mayor. The charter of Bogotá, minimum common rules that generate a sense impediment to implementing
the plan was difficulty in finan-
designed by the mayor Jaime Castro (1992- of belonging, facilitate harmony among citizens cing the debt
1994), made the mayor less dependent on the and lead to respect for shared property and
8 Previous mayors’ teams were
city council,7 which had traditionally acted as heritage and the recognition of citizens’ rights
habitually composed of politici-
co-administrator of the city. Further, because and duties.” This theme was the main focus ans that had suppor ted the
Antanas and Peñalosa came from non-tradi- of Mockus’ administration, which sought to campaign.
tional parties, they had complete freedom when bring about a new urban culture based on
9 Mockus, A. Plan de Desarrol-
choosing members of their administrations,8 mutual respect between citizens through edu- lo Distrital 1995-1997, “Formar
allowing them to choose the people they felt were cational programs. ciudad”, Bogotá, IDCT, 1995
Tr i a l o g 8 2 / 2 0 0 4
5the administration to make better-informed
decisions. In order to improve the effectiveness
of the Observatory, its initially ambitious activi-
ties were later reduced to: short, medium and
long term research projects, polls and ques-
tionnaires regarding policies and actions of the
administration, a database, and a centre of
documentation.
Mockus reduced corruption in the policing of
transit by transferring this task from the police
of the Secretary of Transit and Transport to the
Metropolitan Police, which depend directly on
the National Police. 71% considered this to be
the right decision and thought that the new
institution was less corrupt and better organised.
The administration also undertook the impor-
tant task of cutting “the clientelistic relationship
that had always existed between the legislative
Photo 2: The programs used symbolic, provocative and and executive branches in Colombia”.11
Bogota, Transmilenio Station
(Photo: F. Steinberg) humorous actions to teach citizens to reflect on
the consequences of their actions on urban life. In March of 1996 a telephone referendum
These programs were often quite unpopular- showed that residents did not favour automo-
particularly those that sought to reduce vio- bile restriction, leading the administration to
lence related to alcohol consumption and refrain from such measures. Paradoxically, traf-
injuries due to fireworks. Laws prohibited the fic congestion was considered the city’s worst
sale of alcoholic drinks after 1 AM, the manu- problem in the mid-1990s. One might consider
facture and commercialisation of explosive this plebiscite a serious mistake, considering
powder for fireworks, and campaigns discour- that the objectives of the restrictions were not
aged gun ownership. These initiatives received properly explained. Moreover, populations in
approval ratings of 81%, 77% and 92% for the any part of the world do not vote to restrict the
restrictions regarding gunpowder, alcohol, and use of the automobile.
guns, respectively.10
Lastly, two studies on transport in Bogotá, one
Mockus used educational group games as the by the Japanese agency of technical coopera-
main tool to establish a culture of “self-regula- tion (JICA) and another by the consortium
tion”, consideration, and urban citizenship. INGETEC S.A., BECHTEL y SYSTRA, were
These included: completed in 1997. The study of the Japanese
agency proposed solutions completely mis-
– Cards, red on one side and white on the matched to the economic realities of Colombia
other, distributed among citizens and used and placed emphasis on automobile transport,
as in football (soccer) games to show with plans for elevated, multilevel roads. The
approval or disapproval of actions – above French-Colombian consortium placed empha-
all of drivers sis on an integrated subway and bus system,
– Mimes in the streets that taught drivers to but the proposed routes did not follow the main
respect zebra crossings, to use safety belts traffic arteries. The goal of this study seemed
and not honk horns to be to justify the sales of such infrastructure.
– Actors dressed as monks to make people Although neither plan was implemented, both
reflect on noise pollution helped inform Peñalosa’s administration in con-
– Mass initiatives to promote tourism and figuring the Transmilenio.
proper payment of taxes
Mockus’ reputation suffered when he resigned
Residents of Bogotá approved of these pro- one year before the end of his term to run for
grams, giving them a rating of 7 out of 10 points. president. Residents of Bogotá felt betrayed by
10 Centro Nacional de Consul-
61% said citizen education was the administra- Mockus, and at the end of his period, 74% said
toría, Conocimiento y evalua- tion’s most important initiative and 96% consid- that life in the city had gotten worse or stayed
ción del programa “cultura ciu- ered that these programs should continue. the same.12
dadana”, Bogotá, CNC - IDCT,
unpublished repor t, 1998.
Another innovation of Mockus’ administration The Action, 1998-2000: Investment
11 See ar ticle: , R., “La Revo- was the Observatory of Urban Culture. The and Large Public Works
lución Cachaca” in Semana, l 9 mission of this body was to analyze and evalu-
– 12 January 2001
ate municipal institutions and programs through In 1997 Enrique Peñalosa won 48% of the
12 Op. cit. CNC - IDCT, 1998 a multi-disciplinary approach, thereby allowing votes (619,086), beating the populist Carlos
6 Tr i a l o g 8 2 / 2 0 0 4Moreno De Caro, who attained 31%. Peñalosa at the end of his term, a poll by the newspaper
ran as an independent candidate, after having El Espectador showed that 40% of inhabitants
represented the Liberal party in the assembly qualified his administration as “excellent.”
of Cundinamarca (the province Bogotá is in),
as an economic secretary to President Virgilio No other administration in the 20th century
Barco (1986-1990), Congressman (1990) and worked as much on mobility and public space
mayoral candidate in 1995. Peñalosa’s election in Bogotá. Peñalosa’s main actions regarding
can be interpreted as a vote against the pop- these topics were:
ulism of his opponent.
– improve public transport
The same as Mockus, Peñalosa was 43 when – restrict private automobile use
he became mayor. He studied economics, his- – expand and improve bicycle paths
tory and public administration, and worked as – improve public space
an academic and director of the US consultan-
cy Arthur D. Little. His corporate management The majority of the projects initiated by
style of delegating projects to his young team Peñalosa were completed, started or contract-
(that included many women) facilitated their ed during the term 1998-2000.14 One of the
rapid completion. few exceptions is the project for a subway sys-
tem for the city. Peñalosa’s Integrated System
Peñalosa’s plan of District Development for 1998 - of Mass Transport included both “rigid” (sub-
2000, “Por la Bogotá que Queremos” (For the way) and “flexible” (Transmilenio) elements.
Bogotá We Want) prioritised the following:
The administration had a clear goal regarding
– De-marginalisation public transport: a new system by the 31st of
– Social integration December 2000. Peñalosa created a team
– City on a human scale external to the administration and gave it
– Mobility resources through the United Nations Develop-
– Urbanism and services ment Program (UNDP), which acted as an
– Security and harmony among citizens investment fund.
– Institutional efficiency
The goal of the Transmilenio bus was to provide
The administration also included these mega- a well- organised, efficient means of public trans-
projects: port: an alternative to the chaotic independent-
ly operated busses that dominate the city. These
– Integrated system of mass transport are often operated by overworked drivers, inef-
– Construction and maintenance of roads ficient due to disorganisation, and emit excessive
– Improve and expand the municipal system of amounts of exhaust. The municipality created
parks Transmilenio S.A. (the company) to plan, organ-
– Improve and expand the municipal library ise, and construct the infrastructure, as well as
system supervise the service. The buses and drivers
were contracted to private firms, and the rev-
Peñalosa invited residents of Bogotá to imagine enues and finances are managed by Transmile-
a different city, “a city that today seems utopian, nio S.A. The revenues are distributed as follows:
with trees, bicycles, beautiful sidewalks, full of
parks, with clean rivers, lakes, libraries, clean, 65% operators of the main artery
egalitarian…”.13 Although the mayor told the 20% operators of the feeder routes
inhabitants of Bogotá that they could build 11% fare collection and banking
whatever they imagined, residents remained 3% functioning costs of Transmilenio S.A.
sceptical until the projects were completed. 1% investment fund
Public space and transport were the main focus- The Transmilenio follows the model of Curitiba
es of the administration. Peñalosa’s notion of an and Quito, with main arteries and feeder routes.
egalitarian city where citizens enjoy high quality On the main artery, riders pay for access to an
public space seemed impossible even in 1999. elevated platform, and on the feeder routes rid-
Many of his projects, such as the installation of ers pay once they reach the main artery. Sta-
bollards designed to stop autos from parking on tions are fixed and 500 metres apart. With the
13 Ibídem
the sidewalks, received strong opposition. This new bus system, the municipality went from a
parking practice was customary throughout the passive position regarding public transport to a 14 The administration claims
proactive one. The Transmilenio is widely regard- to have completed 120% of
city, and it made life extremely difficult for pedes-
the development plan. See:
trians. Storeowners, who saw the sidewalks as ed as an excellent bus system, providing well- Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C.
parking spaces for their businesses, reacted organised, fast and comfortable service. In the Bogotá sin fronteras, Alcaldía
violently to the bollards and Peñalosa was almost Integrated System of Mass Transport, the Trans- Mayor de Bogotá D.C, Colec-
ción Bogotá del tercer milenio,
impeached. Peñalosa was able to build his pop- milenio covers the entire city, linking with subway historia de una revolución
ularity as his projects began materializing, and and bicycle paths. Construction of the Trans- urbana, tomo 2, 2000, p. 11.
Tr i a l o g 8 2 / 2 0 0 4
7milenio has 6 phases, and in January 2003, of a country that is in crisis. The future of
work on phase 2 was underway. Bogotá depends on the future of Colombia,
on the end to the war, the fiscal crisis, and
The administration outlined a clear position the recession.
regarding private automobiles; it regarded them
as “the worst threat to quality of life of this In addition to the maintenance of the projects
city.”15 One of Peñalosa’s main aims was to already implemented, the challenges for
get auto users to use public transport. The improving urban transport are:
“pico y placa” program considerably reduced
congestion at peak times with a 40% reduction 1. Give priority to the majority of the population
in private automobile use. Twice a week, pri- by giving preference to mass transit
vate automobiles were prohibited from circulat- 2. Consolidate a multimodal system for the
ing: license plates ending in 1,2,3 and 4 were metropolitan area and region
prohibited to circulate on Monday, 5,6,7 and 8 3. Link transport planning to city planning
on Tuesday, 9,0,1 and 2 on Wednesday, 3, 4, 5 4. Reform and reinforce the entities related to
and 6 on Thursday and 7,8,9 and 0 on Friday. transport, public space and urban planning
5. Rationalise or discourage the use of the
In addition to this measure, the administration automobile
invited Bogotá residents to imagine how the 6. Create an integral parking policy
city would be without cars. The 29th of Febru- 7. Create strategies of communication, partici-
15 Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá ary of 2000 Bogotá celebrated its first (and the pation and harmonisation of citizens
D.C. Bogotá para todos,
world’s largest) Car Free Day. The event proved
Bogotá, Alcaldía Mayor de
Bogotá D.C, Colección Bogotá so popular that residents voted to hold it annu- 1. Many countries have proved that mass
del tercer milenio, historia de ally in a city-wide referendum. transport creates greater benefits for the
una revolución urbana, tomo 3, majority of society in social, economic, environ-
2000, p. 156.
Peñalosa’s Master Plan of Bicycle Paths origi- mental and urban terms. Evaluations show that
16 IDU (Urban Development nally consisted of 350 kilometres, of which about mass transport is 7 to 10 times less costly than
Institute), Repor t on construc- 270 were completed by January 2003. This is individual auto transport.20 Leaders and citi-
tion of bicycle paths, invest-
ment for 205 kilometres the largest network in Latin America and the devel- zens must insist on both elements of the Inte-
oping world. The cost (more than US $46 mil- grated System of Mass Transport, the subway
17 The municipality estab-
lion16 through 2002), was high, but the technical and the Transmilenio bus, when discussing the
lished many norms for the
design and construction of achievement was impressive; the 105 kilometres future of transport in the city.
sidewalks through the following completed in less than three years of Peñalosa’s
documents: Decreto 682 de administration were built on difficult terrain. 2. The analysis of transport in Bogotá can not
agosto 4 de 1.998, Decreto
758 de septiembre 4 de 1.998,
be limited to the district of the city. Although
Decreto 170 de marzo 17 de Public space was greatly improved from 1998- there is no officially defined metropolitan area,
1.999, Acuerdo 38 de diciem- 2000. It went from “being nobody’s place, with- the city’s influence on regional development
bre 13 de 1.999, Decreto 198
de marzo 21 de 2.000, Decreto
out serious attention of the administration, appro- must be taken into account, especially regard-
822 de septiembre 28 de priated for anyone’s private use and without any ing the area to the West, the Sabana (Savan-
2.000, Decreto 1003 de consideration for human beings, to become the nah) de Bogotá. Although the challenge of inte-
noviembre 14 de 2.000. I.
space par excellence of the city”. The Defence gration with surrounding cities is much more
Fuentes y datos, 1.1. Concejo
de Bogotá: Biblioteca Carlos of Public Space office was created to recover political than technical, leaders should begin to
Lleras Restrepo. 1.1.1. Espacio space that had been illegally occupied, and articulate an integrated scheme of multimodal
Público. space for pedestrians was recuperated through metropolitan transport.
18 Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá improvements in sidewalks, traffic signals, light-
D.C. Bogotá para todos, ing and the planting of trees.17 This included: 3. The “Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial” (Ter-
Bogotá, Alcaldía Mayor de
the recovery of 338,297 metres², and the con- ritorial Plan) that covers the period 2000-2010
Bogotá D.C, Colección Bogotá
del tercer milenio, historia de struction of 147,000 metres², of space under originally included the entire Integrated System
una revolución urbana, tomo 3, bridges (these spaces were badly planned and of Mass Transport, thereby linking the necessi-
2000, p. 8. inhospitable), and 432,000 metres² of sidewalks ties of transport planning and urban planning.
19 Much of this section is a – a total of approximately 917,000 metres² of However, the validity of the territorial plan was
development of the conclusion public space.18 The administration recuperat- reduced because construction of the subway
of the book by Ricardo Monte- ed, improved and maintained 1,034 parks, or will not begin during this period. Further, the
zuma, “Presente y futuro de la
movilidad en Bogotá: Retos y 54% of green space in the city. For a cost of Transmilenio was implemented without a clear
realidades”, See: Presente y 212 billion pesos (about US $ 100 million), the integration into a larger urban strategy. Mass
futuro de la movilidad en city government planted almost 70,000 trees, transport and territorial plans must fit into a
Bogotá: Retos y realidades,
Bogotá, Veeduría Distrital –
installed 183,651 planters, and greened 202 kilo- clearly articulated vision of the city. The impor-
Injaviu – El Tiempo, 2000, pp. metres of roadsides and 280 hectares of parks. tance of efficient, non-automobile transport in
173-197. this vision depends on the importance that the
The Future: A National, Integral and different actors – administrators, planners,
20 Merlin, P., "Factores de una Multimodal Challenge19 politicians, media, and citizens – assign it.
política de transpor te urbano"
in El transpor te un reto para el
próximo milenio. Bogotá, Even as Bogotá is experiencing a renaissance, 4. Two valid options for the reform and rein-
CEJA-INJAVIU, 1997, pp. 23-72. it is important to remember that it is the capital forcement of the entities responsible for plan-
8 Tr i a l o g 8 2 / 2 0 0 4ning, organizing, managing and regulating – Subway Photo 3: Bogota ciclorrutas and
new public library
mass transport, public space and urban growth – Transmilenio (Photo: R. Montezuma)
are: creating a single agency or continuing with – Non-motorised transport
various bodies. The most important considera- – Regional trains
tion regarding the entity or entities is means – Public Space
and resources. In order to be effective, it or – Automobiles
they must be able to manoeuvre without too
many obstacles and have sufficient funding, The subway is a fundamental element of the
as in the case of Transmilenio. Integrated System of Mass Transport. Although
the contract for its construction will not be
5. The private auto must be rationalised and signed in the next 10 or 15 years, the popula-
discouraged beyond the “Pico y Placa” pro- tion must insist on a subway. Without it, mobili-
gram; this program might make the car more ty will become increasingly difficult and eventu-
attractive by improving traffic conditions. Charg- ally collapse, and the city will lose competitive-
ing for use of roads and a clearly defined park- ly and tax revenues will reduce, leading to a
ing policy better will better reflect the real cost serious deterioration of quality of life in Bogotá.
of the car to society. In addition, charging for As several authors agree, a city of its size
road use and parking could be an additional needs a high capacity transport system
source of revenue for an integrated, multi- (60,000 to 90,000 passengers an hour in each
modal, metropolitan transport system. direction).21 Further, a subway system implies
a high level of quality of life and socioeconomic
6. Recovering automobile parking is urgent in development of a city; it reduces inequality,
Bogotá, because the recuperation of sidewalks protects the environment and reduces the time
has reduced parking for businesses. However, and money spent on transport.
this matter is also complex; additional parking
infrastructure should not be built on a mass scale, The cost and time of implementing Transmile-
since the car should be discouraged. Nor can nio infrastructure is low, making it a good
parking spaces be reduced (such as in Euro- option for public transport in Bogotá. However,
pean cities), because of safety considerations this system on its own can not meet the trans-
in the city. Another important challenge is the port needs of the city, which is growing at an
professionalisation of “informal” parking areas annual rate of 3%. Transmilenio must work
that are set up in the streets and empty lots. together with the subway, as articulated in the
Integrated System of Mass Transport.
7. Citizen participation in programs and pro-
jects must go beyond presenting proposals. Although there is an average of one bicycle per
Programs must acquire information that facili- three families, bikes have been absent in stud-
tates a truly participatory and constructive dia- ies of transport in Bogotá. Residents currently
logue leading to more effective and beneficial use the bicycle with great frequency for leisure,
change. Reinforcing entities such as the Vee- especially on Sundays, during the “ciclo-vía,”
duría Distrital (District Supervisory) is one way when many roads are closed to motorised
to increase citizen participation. vehicles. Although this event is the largest of its
kind worldwide and often attracts more than
two million participants, when it comes to com-
muting to work, residents perceive bicycles as
a less important mode of transport and a sign
of economic destitution. Recent educational
campaigns to change this perception have had
important effects and must be continued to
reach more of the population. Only when mem-
bers of all social classes use the bicycle will
the notion of the bicycle as a step towards
motorisation (a common idea in the developing
world) be erased. When mayors Enrique 21 See, Op. cit. Fainboim, I.,
Peñalosa and members of their administration and Rodríguez C.J., 2000.
periodically rode to work, they helped to de- Hidalgo, D. “Preguntas y respu-
estas sobre el metro de
stigmatise the bicycle to a large degree.22 Bogotá” in Presente y futuro de
As the failure of bicycle lanes in Paris and la movilidad en Bogotá: Retos
Multimodality: the Challenge to other cities in the 1980’s have taught us, the y realidades, Bogotá, Veeduría
Distrital – Injaviu – El Tiempo,
Balance Means of Transport same investment made in infrastructure must
Editor: Montezuma, R. 2000,
be made in education, supervision and safety. pp. 130-138
Consolidating a multimodal transport system
22 Antanas Mockus also rode
for the metropolitan region represents one of Regional trains are currently being studied,
his bicycle during his second
the largest challenges for Bogotá. The ele- and this is an excellent opportunity to articulate term, beginning in January of
ments of such a system include: a solid metropolitan plan of transport. The city 2001 until the end of 2003.
Tr i a l o g 8 2 / 2 0 0 4
9Photo 4: Bus station at the outskirts
of Bogotá (Photo: D: Hidalgo)
of Bogotá should support such an effort, since Peñalosa almost entirely eliminated the pro-
it is an opportunity to organise the many bus grams of social education initiated by his pre-
lines of surrounding cities that pass through decessor, despite the desire of the population
the capitol. to maintain them - 91% according to a poll.23
The rupture between reflection and action was
The recuperation of sidewalks in Bogotá was an intense, and both administrations could be criti-
important achievement of Peñalosa’s administra- cised in these respects: Mockus, for excessive
23 Poll from 7 April 1998 by
tion, and the process of recovering space for reflection and too little action, and Peñalosa for
Napoleón Franco, commissio- the pedestrian must continue throughout the too little reflection on his many actions.
ned by El Tiempo, people from city, in favour of the person and in detriment to The great achievements of both mayors were
“estratos” 2 to 6 [a classificati-
on of economic status, from
the automobile. Not only sidewalks and parks, the result of a new kind of government centred
1-6, 6 being the highest] and but also highways, roads and parking spaces on issues rather than party politics or ideology.
from all par ts of Bogotá. See: must be considered public space and their Both leaders acted as ideologically right, left,
Centro de Estudios Sociales,
potential for use by various modes of transport and centre, and at times went to extreme posi-
Memoria y Evaluación Del
Instituto De Cultura Y Turismo (automobile, bicycle, walking). Proper reflection tions. Mockus and Peñalosa transformed
Programa De Cultura Ciudadana, and action regarding public space requires a Bogotá, one of the most chaotic cities in the
Bogotá, Universidad Nacional multidisciplinary approach. world, to a model of urban development and
De Colombia - Facultad De
Ciencias Humanas - IDCT, transport. Various agencies of the United
Informe no publicado, 1998. The automobile is a necessary evil for all cities, Nations have recognised the vast improve-
and it is important to remember its advantages ments in infrastructure, administration and the
and disadvantages in the urban setting. reduction in violence. U.S. and Swedish inter-
This article is a summary and Because the car is not convenient for commut- national development organisations gave pres-
translation of the book “TheTransfor- ing during peak times, its use must be ratio-
mation of Bogota 1995-2000.
tigious prizes to the public library system and
Between the redefinition of space nalised. The environmental damage of automo- the Transmilenio, respectively. Residents feel a
and the citizen” by Ricardo Mon- biles provides compelling logic for further ratio- new sense of ownership, belonging and pride
tezuma. Translated and sum- nalisation, particularly in the case of Bogotá, in the city, and manifest this in events such as
marised by Jonas Hagen
where the high altitude – 2600 metres above “ciclo-vía nocturna” (night ciclo-vía) in Decem-
sea level – impedes the efficient functioning of ber of 2002, when more than 3 million cele-
combustion engines. brated in the streets.
Ricardo Montezuma
Msc and Ph.D. in Urbanism and
Regional Planning of ENPC, París. Reflection, Action and Continuity for
Researcher, university teacher and a Change in Mentality
consultant. Director of Fundación
Ciudad Humana, Bogotá.
Contact: part to the synergy between the pedagogy of
Mockus and the action of Peñalosa. However,
10 Tr i a l o g 8 2 / 2 0 0 4The Bogotá Model for Sustainable
Transportation:
Inspiring Developing Cities
throughout the World
Dario Hidalgo and Gabrielle Hermann
Until recently, highways and heavy rail transit The City and its Transport Strategy
were considered essential for the advancement
of economies in developing cities. This assump- Bogotá is a vast metropolitan area with more
tion has been challenged, and more cities are than 6 million inhabitants and about 4,000 peo-
focusing on non-motorized and bus-based tran- ple per square kilometer. It used to be an
sit alternatives. Very often decision makers and example of chaos in urban development and
planners look for ideas in developed country transportation.2 More than 50% of its built area
cities, but conditions are so different that mod- was developed informally and regulated mass
els are not applicable. Bogotá, Colombia, has transit was not part of its transportation sys-
emerged as an attractive model for other devel- tem. Public transit represented more than 70%
oping cities, thanks to its series of low-cost and of the trips, and was supplied in obsolete, inad-
high impact projects aimed at making the city equate and unsafe small buses that vigorously
friendlier to pedestrians, bicyclists and transit com- competed with each other for every passenger.
muters. The best recognized of these measures Travel times were on average above one hour
is the TransMilenio Bus Rapid Transit System. and accidents, pollution and congestion were 1 see References
growing to unacceptable levels. Metro and ele-
2 Hidalgo, D. 2002 “Bogotá and
Bogotá's success has surprised the transporta- vated highways were proposed3 but there was its Transpor tation System” in
tion-planning world, making it a potential best no way to finance them. This lack of financing Second International Conference
practice for developing and developed cities forced the city to find innovative low cost alter- on Urban Transportation Systems,
organized by ASCE and APTA, Alex-
alike.1 Research on Bogotá’s transportation natives, while preserving the urban landscape. andria,VA,USA, April 14-18, 2002
renaissance and how it affects the city’s eco-
nomic, social, and environmental health is cur- In1998, Mayor Enrique Peñalosa launched a long 3 JICA, 1997 "Santa Fe de
Bogotá Transpor t Master Plan
rently being revealed in several studies. This term mobility strategy based on non-motorized
Study", Chodai Co. Ltd in asso-
article is concerned with the way lessons from transportation, bus transit improvements and ciation with Yachiyo Enginee-
Bogotá are being applied and the difficulties automobile restrictions, which has been con- ring Co. Ltd. Japan Internatio-
tinued in succeeding local administrations.4 nal Cooperation Agency (JICA),
associated with project implementation through-
Santa Fe de Bogotá, República
out the developing world. Bogotá’s package of measures to control the de Colombia, 1997; SITM ,1997
“Estudio del Sistema Integrado
de Transpor te Masivo para la
Das nachhaltige Transport-Modell von Bogota inspiriert Städte in aller Welt
Sabana de Bogotá”, Ingetec-
Das seit 1998 in der kolumbianischen Hauptstadt Bogotà realisierte Schnellbus-System „TransMilenio“ gilt Bechtel-Systra for FONADE-
heute weltweit als Vorzeigebeispiel für einen effizienten, kostengünstigen und nachhaltigen öffentlichen Per- DNP, Bogota, October 1997
sonennahverkehr in schnellwachsenden Städten des Südens. Der vorliegende Beitrag beschreibt in einem
ersten Teil die stadtpolitischen Strategien und Ziele, die mit einem derartigen Verkehrskonzept verbunden 4 A 200 km network of bicycle-
sind (neben einem leistungsfähigen Personentransport vor allem auch eine entscheidende Aufwertung der ways and the construction and
öffentlichen Räume und ihrer Aufenthaltsqualitäten in der Innenstadt durch Eindämmung des motorisierten recuperation of public space
throughout the city increased the
Individualverkehs), und geht in einem zweiten Abschnitt der Ausstrahlungskraft und der Übertragbarkeit des
share of non-motorized transpor-
bogotánischen Modells auf andere Großstädte und Metropolen in Lateinamerika, aber auch anderen Konti- tation between 1998 and 2003.
nenten nach. Dabei baut Bogotá auf den seit den 70er Jahren im brasilianischen Curitiba gemachten Erfah- Bicycle was less than 1% of the
rungen auf und ist seinerseits Vorreiterbeispiel für ähnliche Projekte in Léon (Mexiko), Kapstadt, Dar es trips and different surveys indi-
Salaam, Dakar, Lagos, Jakarta und Bangkok. Deren Umsetzung ist dennoch nicht leicht; wesentliche Hinder- cate a daily use of more than 4%
nisse sind u.a. ein Mangel an langfristigen stadtpolitischen Visionen, Finanzierungsschwierigkeiten, z.B. auch currently. Moreover, a very strong
für die notwendigen technischen Vorstudien, Widerstände seitens des traditionellen Transportgewerbes, alther- car restriction policy is in place,
with 40% of the private vehicles
gebrachte rechtliche und administrative Rahmenbedingungen sowie eine vielfach mangelnde Transparenz
banned from circulating in the peak
bei öffentlichen Bieterverfahren. Zur Durchsetzung innovativer Konzepte ist auch ein aktives bis „aggressives“ hours, as well as other disincen-
Marketing nötig. tives to car use as a 25% gas tax
and on-street parking restraints.
Tr i a l o g 8 2 / 2 0 0 4
11car and create public space is often referred to realm.The air is cleaner, pedestrians and
as the “Bogota Model.” Technocrats are prais- cyclists are safer, and citizens have access to
ing this model in articles, websites, and listservs more public space.11 For instance, before
and lending agencies are re-writing their fund- TransMilenio public transport users spent an
ing criteria and policy recommendations using average of two hours per trip just to travel 20
its principles.5 Most importantly, local, regional kilometers; today, the same trip takes less than
and national governments across the globe are one hour. In the TransMilenio corridor, environ-
trying to apply the lessons learned in Bogotá to mental and noise pollution have decreased
their circumstances, and many planners and more than 26%, while traffic accidents have
policy makers have visited the Colombian capi- decreased more than 86%. Before TransMile-
tal.6 Current and former government officials nio, in an average two-year period, 130 people
have been also invited to share their experi- died in traffic accidents in the corridors now
ence in several places around the world. used by the BRT system. After two years of
operation and the transporting of 330 million
The most visible component of the mobility passengers, only fourteen people have died
strategy is the TransMilenio Bus Rapid Transit there.12 Emission reductions come from
System (BRT). BRT is defined as a “mass tran- replacement of obsolete transit fleet, more effi-
sit system using exclusive right of way lanes cient bus transit operations, and modal shift
fig. 1: Advertisement for TransMi-
lenio (Courtesy TRANSMILENIO that mimic the rapidity and performance of metro from less efficient modes. A rough estimative
S.A.)
systems but utilise bus technology rather than shows a reduction of about 11% in carbon
rail vehicle technology”.7 BRT represents a way monoxide, 9% nitrogen oxides and 10% hydro-
to improve mobility at relatively low cost through carbons.13
incremental investment in a combination of bus
infrastructure, equipment, operational improve- Despite the impressive improvements over the
ments, and technology.8 last 6 years, transport problems in Bogotá are
far from being completely solved. The BRT
The TransMilenio System is a “high end” BRT System covers 15% of the transit trips, and is
that includes specialized infrastructure, efficient expected to reach 23% when Phase II will be
operations, advanced fare collection systems, a completed in 2005. Hence, the majority of the
new institutional arrangement and a distinctive commuters still face lengthy and unsafe jour-
image. Its capacity is comparable with heavy rail neys. Furthermore, with an improved economy
transit (metro and regional rail) at a fraction of in 2003 came an additional 70,000 vehicles to
their capital cost and without operational subsidies.9 Bogotá's already clogged streets. This prompt-
ed the municipality to increase the length of
5 See references and the web- TransMilenio’s Phase I was implemented between car use restrictions.14
site “Go BRT” (www.gobr t.org) 1998 and 2002 and consists of 41 km of exclu-
[accessed April 26, 2004]
sive busways, 61 stations, 470 articulated buses There are challenges to the expansion of
6 The city agency in charge of and 235 feeder buses, with a total cost of US$ TransMilenio beyond Phase II due to a lack of
the BRT System TRANSMILENIO 350 million. By the end of 2003 it provided ser- financial resources and resistance by the tradi-
S.A. has received delegations
from more than 30 countries, and
vice to 750,000 passengers daily and 32,000 tional transportation sector. Even though there
about 2,000 international visitors. passengers / hour / direction in the heaviest has been significant effort to involve the majori-
loaded section. Phase II implementation start- ty of private bus operators in the system imple-
7 Wright, 2003
ed in December 2003 with 13 km and 27 km mentation as well as making them stockhold-
8 Levinson, et.al, 2003 under construction for a total of 335 articulated ers, many have been left out of the process.
buses and 170 feeder buses to be gradually Those not participating are challenging Trans-
9 Hidalgo, D. 2003 "The back- introduced before the end of 2005.10 Around Milenio’s expansion.Therefore, despite the over-
bone of the mobility strategy of
Bogotá: TransMilenio", in Public 600,000 additional passengers are expected to whelming public support for TransMilenio, the
Transport International Magazine, use the system. political will for public transport reform may not
UITP, Number 5, September 2003 be as strong as it was under previous adminis-
10 See www.TransMilenio.gov.co
Innovative operations and use of advanced tech- trations. Clearly, even in Bogotá, pursuing a
nology are part of the BRT, but its main feature long-term vision that favors the majority of the
11 Molina et.al, 2004 is a clear definition of the roles of government citizens is imperative, but often very difficult,
12 Based on Sandoval E.,
and private providers. The public sector is in due to opposition from minority groups.
“TransMilenio: Social Investment charge of planning, developing and maintaining
in Infrastructure” (unpublished infrastructure and controlling service delivery. Enrique Peñalosa - Spokesman for
manuscript, presented at the
Private companies, through concession con- Sustainable Transport
World Bank Forum, Washing-
ton, January 2003) tracts, acquire equipment and provide the oper-
ations of trunk line and feeder bus services Bogotá’s former mayor, Enrique Peñalosa
13 Molina et.al, 2004
and fare collection. (1998-2000) transformed Bogotá’s physical
14 Starting July 1998, 40% of the structure with policies aimed at limiting car dom-
cars are banned from traveling The most exciting aspect of transportation- inance. Peñalosa was fortunate that the city was
from 7:00-9:00 am and 5:00-7:00 pm. related developments in Bogotá is how much in sound financial condition when he became
The ban was increased by one
hour in each peak period in the life in the city has improved, with benefits span- mayor; but there was not a clear long-term
morning in June 2004. ning the social, environmental, and economic vision on the transport side.15 His political
12 Tr i a l o g 8 2 / 2 0 0 4Sie können auch lesen
