Die Klima-Investitionslücke der G7 Staaten - Wie viel Geld in Kohle, Öl und Gas statt in die Energiewende fließt - Greenpeace
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Die Klima- Investitionslücke der G7 Staaten Wie viel Geld in Kohle, Öl und Gas statt in die Energiewende fließt
Die Klima-Investitionslücke
der G7 Staaten
Wie viel Geld in Kohle, Öl und Gas
statt in die Energiewende fließt
Studie im Auftrag
von Greenpeace e.V.
Juni 2022
New Economics Foundation
www.nefconsulting.com
Autor:innen
Emmet Kiberd, Consultant (project manager)
Paulo Yunda, Assistant Researcher
Kein Geld von Industrie und Staat
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Impressum
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Politische Vertretung Berlin Marienstraße 19 – 20, 10117 Berlin, Tel. 030/30 88 99 - 0 V.i.S.d.P. Jonas Ott Text Emmet Kiberd, Paulo Yunda Produktion Ute Zimmermann
Foto image/HarryxLaub Gestaltung Klasse 3bVorwort
Liebe Leser:innen,
mit ihren historischen CO2-Emissionen tragen die G7-Staaten eine große Ver
antwortung für das Klima: Damit unumkehrbare Klimaschäden und der Klimakol-
laps verhindert werden können, müssen die sieben reichsten Demokratien jetzt
dieser Verantwortung gerecht werden und sofort sämtliche Investitionen in klima-
schädliche Infrastruktur für Kohle, Öl und Gas stoppen. Nur wenn sie ihre Kapital-
flüsse und Investitionen sofort weg von fossilen Energien und hin in die ökologi-
sche Transformation lenken, können sie die Pariser Klimaziele noch erreichen.
Anlässlich des diesjährigen G7-Gipfels unter deutscher Ratspräsidentschaft hat
Greenpeace das Institut New Economic Foundation (NEF) beauftragt, die so
genannte Klimainvestitionslücke der G7-Mitgliedstaaten zu untersuchen. Das
Ergebnis: Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Italien, Japan,
Kanada und die USA planen seit 2020 fast ebenso hohe öffentliche In-
vestitionen in fossile Energien wie für den Ausbau von Sonnen- und
Windkraft (geplante Investitionen für fossile Energien: 211,7 Milliarden Euro; ge-
plante Investitionen für klimafreundliche Energieprojekte: 265,7 Milliarden Euro).
Für die Energiewende und den klimafreundlichen Umbau der Wirtschaft investie-
ren die Staaten der G7 viel zu wenig – nämlich deutlich weniger als zehn Prozent
des erforderlichen Gesamtinvestitionsvolumens, welches zur Einhaltung der
1,5-Grad-Grenze nötig wäre. In Italien, den USA, Kanada und Japan ist die
Klimainvestitionslücke sogar noch deutlich größer als in den anderen Staaten.
Deutschland muss jährlich rund 118,9 Milliarden Euro investieren, um den
klimagerechten Umbau der Wirtschaft zu schaffen. Tatsächlich lagen die
Gesamtinvestitionen in die ökologische Wende zwischen 2015 und 2020 aber nur
bei rund 26,4 Milliarden Euro jährlich, wovon 9,8 Milliarden Euro öffentliche
Gelder waren. Zum Vergleich: zwischen 2015 und 2021 importierte Deutschland
im Schnitt jedes Jahr fossile Energieträger im Wert von 87,9 Milliarden Euro
– 17,2 Prozent davon kamen aus Russland. Zur Einhaltung der kritischen
1,5-Grad-Grenze müsste Deutschland fast das zwölffache an öffentlichen und
privaten Geldern für die grüne Transformation aufbringen, als im Schnitt seit 2020
investiert wurde. Klimaschädliche Investitionen in die Neuerschließung fossiler
Energieträger und damit verbundene Infrastrukturinvestitionen müssen dagegen
so schnell wie möglich auf null gesenkt werden.
Die vorliegende Analyse zeigt sehr deutlich, dass die größten demokratischen
Wirtschaftsnationen ihrer immensen Verantwortung nicht gerecht werden.
Sie müssen sofort die Klimainvestitionslücke schließen, um den Klimakollaps
zu verhindern. Gleichzeitig müssen sie mit ihren finanziellen Mitteln und ihrem
technologischen Know-How die weltweite Energiesystemwende einleiten.
Jonas Ott
Greenpeace-Experte für erneuerbare Energien
Hamburg, Juni 2022Die zentralen Ergebnisse der Kurzexpertise: Kein G7-Staat plant derzeit mehr als zehn Prozent der Investitionen in die Energiewende und den klimafreundlichen Umbau der Wirtschaft, die zur Erreichung des 1,5 Grad-Ziels nötig wären. Frankreich, Italien, Japan und die USA planen derzeit sogar weniger als zwei Prozent der benötigten Gelder dafür ein. Die G7-Staaten planen insgesamt nahezu ebenso viel Geld für klima- schädliche fossile Energien (211,7 Milliarden Euro) ein wie für saubere Ener- gielösungen (265,7 Milliarden Euro). Die bisherigen Gesamtinvestitionen in den klimafreundlichen Umbau der Wirtschaft (2015–2021) und die zukünftig vorgesehenen öffentlichen Investitionen (2020–heute) sind in allen G7-Staaten deutlich zu niedrig, um das 1,5 Grad-Ziel einzuhalten. Die Lücke zwischen den geplanten und den benötigten Investitionen in den Klimaschutz ist in Kanada, Japan und den USA am größten. Inlandsinvestitionen: In den Jahren 2015–2021 tätigten die USA, Groß britannien und insbesondere Kanada im Verhältnis zu ihrer Wirtschaftsleis- tung die höchsten Investitionen in fossile Energien im eigenen Land. Bei den USA und Kanada sind im Verhältnis zu ihrer Wirtschaftsleistung zu- sätzlich die inländischen Investitionen in fossile Energien deutlich höher als die öffentlichen eingeplanten Gelder und Ausgaben für saubere Energie. Seit 2020 haben Deutschland, Frankreich und Italien mehr Gelder in öffentliche Finanzierungen für erneuerbare Energien als in fossile Energien eingeplant. In absoluten Zahlen haben die USA, Großbritannien und Kanada in den vergangenen zwei Jahren die größten Investitionen in fossile Energien getätigt. Deutschland und Frankreich haben im Verhältnis zu ihrer Wirtschafts leistung seit 2020 die größte Summe in saubere Energien investiert. Beide Länder müssten jedoch insgesamt rund 12 bzw. 22 Mal mehr in ein klimagerechtes Energiesystem investieren. Deutschland muss seine jährlichen Gesamtinvestition in die Energiewen- de im Verhältnis zu den vergangenen Jahren von 26,4 Milliarden auf min- destens 118,9 Milliarden Euro vervierfachen. Zum Vergleich: In den letzten Jahren hat Deutschland jährlich für durchschnittlich rund 88 Milliarden Euro fossile Energieträger aus dem Ausland bezogen.
THE CLIMATE
INVESTMENT GAP OF
G7 COUNTRIES
How G7 money is flowing into coal, oil, and gas
instead of the energy transition
HOW G7 MONEY IS
FLOWING INTO
How G7 money is flowing COAL,
into coal, oil, and gas
A report based on research commissioned by
OIL,
instead ofAND GAS
the energy
Greenpeace Germany transition
INSTEAD OF THE
How G7 money is flowing into coal, oil, and gas
ENERGY
instead of the energy transition
TRANSITIONTHE
CLIMATE INVESTMENT
GAP OF G7
COUNTRIESThe Climate Investment Gap of G7 Countries
THE CLIMATE INVESTMENT GAP OF THE G7
COUNTRIES
How G7 money is flowing into coal, oil, and gas instead of
the energy transition
This report was completed in June 2022. It is based on research commissioned by
Greenpeace Germany
NEF project team:
Emmet Kiberd, Consultant (project manager)
Paulo Yunda, Assistant Researcher
The consultancy of the New Economics Foundation, NEF
Consulting helps put new economics into practice with people
Through its consultancy and practice programmes, the New
and the planet at the heart of decision-making.
Economics Foundation helps put new economics into practice
with people and the planet at the heart of decision-making.
The New Economics Foundation is the UK’s leading think tank
promoting social, economic, and environmental justice to
The New Economics Foundation is the UK’s leading think tank
transform the economy so that it works for people and the planet.
. promoting social, economic, and environmental justice to
transform the economy so that it works for people and the planet.
The consultancy of the New Economics Foundation, NEF Consulting
helps put new economics into practice with people and the planet at the
The consultancy of the New Economics Foundation, NEF Consulting
heart of decision-making.
helps put new economics into practice with people and the planet at the
heart of decision-making.
The New Economics Foundation is the UK’s leading think tank
promoting social, economic, and environmental justice to transform the
The New Economics Foundation is the UK’s leading think tank
economy so that it works for people and the planet.
NEF Consulting Limited
promoting social, economic, and environmental justice to transform the
economy so that it works for people and the planet.
New Economics Foundation
10 Salamanca Place, London SE1 7HB
www.nefconsulting.com
Tel: 020 7820 6300
2The Climate Investment Gap of G7 Countries
CONTENTS
Introduction and context ........................................................................................................ 4
Fossil fuel investment and expenditure by G7 countries........................................................ 4
Required investment for transition and planned investment .................................................. 7
Conclusion and investment gaps .......................................................................................... 8
Focus on: Germany ............................................................................................................ 10
Endnotes............................................................................................................................. 13
3The Climate Investment Gap of G7 Countries
INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
In the coming decades, it will be crucial for the Group of 7 (G7) countries, which are among
the largest and most powerful economies in the world, to make radical changes to their
energy systems. This is required both to begin mitigating their substantial environmental
impact and to collaborate with other countries in the global south on a level playing field,
helping them to make a similar transition. An important first step in this transition will be to
scale down investment and production in fossil-fuel-based energy systems over the coming
years, while the ultimate aim of this process should be the phasing out entirely of these
systems and a wholesale shift to renewable energy systems. While carbon-intensive
expenditure directly impedes a just transition to renewable energy sources, international
financial flows in fossil fuel sectors also contribute funding for devastating wars, such as the
ongoing war following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This nexus between the just
transition, renewable energy sovereignty, and the funding of war adds further urgency to the
task of scaling up investment in renewable energy systems.
This short paper presents the findings of research into the investment and expenditure of the
G7 relating to fossil fuels and clean energy investments. We outline the current level of
fossil-fuel dependence among these countries and the money flowing via fossil fuel towards
catastrophic wars, before estimating the required level of investment to achieve a fully
renewable energy system and net zero CO2 emissions in each G7 country. We conclude by
highlighting the large investment gap between what is required to avert climate breakdown
and the current climate investment plans of each country.
FOSSIL FUEL INVESTMENT AND EXPENDITURE BY
G7 COUNTRIES
Figure 1: Average annual fossil fuel imports (2015–2021) of G7 countries by origin1
200.0
180.0
Average annual imports
160.0
140.0
(USD billions)
120.0
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
USA Japan Germany France Italy UK Canada
Rest of world United Arab Emirates Saudi Arabia Russia
The G7 countries are major importers of fossil fuel products. Their fossil fuel imports as a
share of GDP vary, with the USA (0.9% of GDP) importing relatively less than countries like
Italy (2.9%), Japan (2.8%), and Germany (2.6%). Unlike the other G7 countries, Canada is a
major net exporter of fossil fuels,2 and the USA has moved towards becoming a net exporter
4The Climate Investment Gap of G7 Countries
of oil and gas in recent years.3, 4 Several countries import a large share of their fossil fuels
from regimes that are perpetrating major ongoing conflicts. Italy (21.9% of all its fossil fuel
imports), Germany (17.2%), and France (12.5%) rely more heavily on fossil fuel imports from
Russia, whereas Japan sources a significant proportion of its fossil fuel imports from Saudi
Arabia (15.5%) and the United Arab Emirates (15.7%). In this way, the continued reliance of
G7 economies on fossil fuels has a direct implication for the funding of governments that
have instigated wars in Ukraine and Yemen.5
Figure 2: Average annual FDI stock of G7 countries in fossil fuel activities (2015–2020)6
9.0% 8.1%
FDI stock as a proportion
8.0%
7.0%
of 2020 GDP
6.0% 5.1%
5.0% 4.4%
4.0%
3.0%
2.0%
0.8%
1.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%
0.0%
UK France Canada USA Germany Japan Italy
The G7 economies also have a major stake in fossil fuel sectors via foreign direct investment
(FDI), which occurs when private investors based in G7 countries own a stake in fossil fuel
enterprises abroad.7 Fossil fuels FDI from the UK, France, and Canada is significant in
comparison with their GDP levels. The largest stocks of fossil fuel FDI among the G7 are
those of the UK ($220.6bn), the USA ($162.3bn), France ($133.5bn), and Canada ($71.9bn),
while the other three countries have far less FDI in fossil fuel sectors.
Domestically, the level of investment in fossil fuel sectors varies among the group (Figure 3).
In recent years this investment has been higher in the UK (0.55% of GDP), the USA
(0.82%), and especially Canada (1.93%), despite clear scientific advice that fossil fuel
production needs to be reduced to contain global temperature rises to 1.5°C.8 In the USA
and Canada, domestic investment in fossil fuels has far outstripped overall investment in
clean energy generation (private and public combined)9 in recent years, while in the UK
fossil fuel investments were also higher relative to GDP. On the other hand, in France and
Germany, the investment in clean energy generation was higher than in other G7 economies
during this period and investment in fossil fuels was relatively low.
5The Climate Investment Gap of G7 Countries
Figure 3: Investment of G7 countries in fossil fuels,10 investment in clean energy projects,11
and public funds committed to clean projects12 (all figures shown per annum and as a
proportion of 2020 GDP)13
2.50%
1.93%
Expenditure or investment as a
1.61%
proportion of 2020 GDP
2.00%
1.08%
1.05%
1.50%
0.82%
0.79%
0.55%
0.52%
0.51%
1.00%
0.42%
0.36%
0.29%
0.22%
0.18%
0.16%
0.16%
0.08%
0.07%
0.05%
0.03%
0.50%
0.00%
Japan Germany France Italy UK USA Canada
Public funds committed to clean projects (2020-2022)
Investment in clean energy projects (2015-2020)
Domestic investment in fossil fuels (2015-2020)
Since the beginning of 2020, the governments of the UK, France, and Germany have
committed more public funds to fossil-intensive spending14 than they have in support of
clean energy.15 On the other hand, Japan and Italy have committed very little in public funds
to support fossil-intensive activities in the same period. Relative to their economic size, Italy
and Canada have directed the most new public spending to clean energy interventions since
January 2020 (Figure 3), with these funds exceeding 1% of GDP for both countries. Canada
(2.1% of GDP), the UK (1.6%), and France (1.1%) have committed the most public funding
to fossil fuel-based activities in the past two and a half years relative to their economic size.
Figure 4: Public funds committed to clean, fossil-intensive, and other energy projects since
2020 by G7 countries16 110.4
104.7
120.0
(Jan 2020 to present, USD billions)
100.0
Public money committed
80.0
49.1
60.0
42.2
41.9
34.1
33.3
27.9
27.1
26.9
40.0
22.8
22.2
20.7
19.1
17.6
16.0
20.0
8.9
4.4
1.6
1.5
0.1
0.0
Canada Japan Germany France Italy UK USA
Fossil commitments Clean energy commitments Other energy commitments
In light of this data on imports, investment, and public expenditure, it is clear that G7
countries continue to fund the fossil fuel sector despite its central role in exacerbating the
climate crisis. There are some signs from clean energy investment of a shift in favour of
6The Climate Investment Gap of G7 Countries
renewables occurring in France and Germany, though public funds are still being committed
to fossil-intensive policies in these countries.
REQUIRED INVESTMENT FOR TRANSITION AND
PLANNED INVESTMENT
It is vital for G7 countries to begin a rapid transition from fossil fuels to a fully renewable
energy system and a decarbonised economy to limit global temperature rises to 1.5°C. This
can be achieved through a rapid scaling up of investment across the economy; a growing
evidence base has developed to indicate the scale of investment required. We have
modelled the capital investment required to transition to a 100% renewable energy system17
and to achieve net zero CO2 emissions by 2050 at the latest in each G7 country, drawing on
the best available evidence (Table 1). While absolute precision is impossible, the extensive
research and modelling in the underlying sources give us a good idea of the scale of
investment that will be required and a firm foundation on which to draw conclusions about
the investment gap.
Table 1. Estimated investment required by G7 countries for net zero across the whole
economy with a fully renewable energy system
Country Investment Sources
required for
transition
(USD billions)
Germany 3,666.1 Sufficiency2035 scenario from Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy
(2020): Paths to a Climate-Neutral Energy System18
Achieves net zero by 2035
France 5,911.7 Main scenario from Institut Rousseau report (2022): 2% pour 2
degrés,19 adjusted using M0 100% renewables costing from RTE
(2022)20
Achieves net zero by 2050
Italy 4,366.6 Modelling based on cost estimates by Economia e Sostenibilità (2020)21
and the cost of transition to 100% renewables by 2040 from the Institute
for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney22
Achieves net zero by 2050
United 2,001.5 Capital expenditure in the Tailwinds scenario from the UK Climate
Kingdom Change Committee’s Sixth Carbon Budget model,23 modelled for 100%
renewables using underlying data
Achieves net zero by 2042
United 39,510.0 E+ RE+ scenario from Princeton University (2021): Net Zero America:
States of Potential Pathways, Infrastructure, and Impacts, 24 based on the present
America value of investment required
Achieves net zero by 2050
Canada 1,108.6 Modelling of abatement costs of achieving net zero CO2 emissions by
2050 relative to the government’s 2021 reference case, drawing on the
methodology used by Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario25
Achieves net zero by 2050
Japan 10,022.0 Main scenario from McKinsey (2021): How Japan could reach carbon
neutrality by 2050,26 modelled for 100% renewable generation
Achieves net zero by 2050
7The Climate Investment Gap of G7 Countries
These capital investment estimates would be offset to some extent by the reduction in
operational costs that would arise from the use of more efficient clean technology.27 In the
model scenario that we have adopted for the UK, for example, there is estimated to be a
saving of $708.5bn in total on operational costs, yielding a net cost of $1,293.0bn to achieve
net zero with fully renewable energy. Our research into the required total investment also
revealed that there is a limited amount of evidence available in Canada at present28 and a
lack of modelling of scenarios that do not rely heavily on carbon capture and storage in the
USA.
We have reviewed the planned investment of each G7 country based on government
strategies and proposals (Table 2). There remains a large gap for each country between the
level of investment in transition they are currently anticipating and the required amount to
make a rapid transition.
Table 2. Principal climate investments planned by the governments of G7 countries
Country Planned Sources
climate
investment
(USD billions)
Germany 363.9 Planned investment includes the industrial transformation announced
up to 2026, sustainable investments planned, and the green stimulus
for transport.
France 46.5 Planned investment includes the France Relance recovery plan and
green investment in the France 2030 Investment Plan.
Italy 52.1 We have included missions 2 and 3 from the National Recovery Plan,
deducting money already spent.
United 128.4 Planned investment includes the expected private investment and
Kingdom public investment from the Ten Point Plan.
United States 555.0 A provisional figure based on the total value of the climate investment
of America proposed under the revised version of the Build Back Better Act,
which has not yet passed into law
Canada 87.1 This includes the emissions reduction plan for 2030, the Zero
Emission Transition Fund, the Net Zero Accelerator Fund, and new
public transit investments.
Japan 163.5 The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry provides the data for the
green growth strategy in Japan to reach net zero.
CONCLUSION AND INVESTMENT GAPS
A comparison between the total amount of investment required for the transition between
now and 2050, and the investment currently planned by the G7, illustrates a vast investment
gap that will need to be closed without delay (Figure 5). While the scale of the investments
mobilised by many G7 countries in recent years may be large relative to anything that came
before, we find that none of the countries has yet planned investments that cover more than
10% of the required spending until 2050. The planned investments of Japan, the USA, Italy,
and France are particularly small relative to the scale of the challenge faced by those
countries.
8The Climate Investment Gap of G7 Countries
Figure 5: Currently planned climate investments as a proportion of the total required
investment (until 2050) for a just transition by country
12.0%
9.9%
10.0%
7.9%
8.0%
6.4%
6.0%
4.0%
2.0% 1.6% 1.4% 1.2%
0.8%
0.0%
Germany Canada UK Japan USA Italy France
Much more ambitious intervention will be needed to mobilise investment of a scale that is
commensurate with the need to rapidly decarbonise the world’s largest economies. A first
step is to stop moving in the wrong direction by redirecting investable funds out of fossil fuel
production and by not allocating public funds to support fossil-intensive activities wherever
possible (while ensuring a just transition).
Figure 6: Recent investment into clean energy, public funds committed to clean energy
projects, investment in fossil fuels, and required investment for a just transition to a fully
renewable energy system (all figures expressed as averages per annum)29 1411.1
1600.0
1400.0
1200.0
USD billions per annum
1000.0
800.0
600.0
357.9
211.1
400.0
171.7
155.9
130.9
71.5
45.7
41.8
39.6
37.0
31.7
200.0
30.0
20.8
20.3
17.3
14.9
14.0
13.8
11.1
9.4
7.9
2.8
2.9
1.3
0.9
0.9
0.0
Japan Germany France Italy UK USA Canada
Investment in clean energy projects (2015-2020) Public funds committed to clean projects (2020-2022)
Domestic investment in fossil fuels (2015-2020) Annual required investment for transition (2022-2050)
This redirection of finances carries a triple benefit, helping to mitigate further environmental
breakdown, building capacity for a more energy-efficient economy, and limiting the revenues
of governments that are waging catastrophic wars. In particular, in G7 countries where fossil
fuels account for a larger amount of annual investment (Figure 6), the potential improvement
from redirecting funds is greater. The USA, omitted from Figure 6 for clarity, faces the largest
9The Climate Investment Gap of G7 Countries
investment gap by far, with a need to invest over $1.4tn per annum in decarbonisation, in
contrast with a planned (but unconfirmed) public investment package of $555bn and existing
annual investment in clean energy of $222bn.
Focus on: Germany
Modelling by the Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy (2020)30 found that the total
investment required to reduce Germany’s energy-related CO2 emissions to zero by
2035 is $3.67 trillion (between 2020 and 2050).31 We estimate that this is 10 times
the investment currently planned ($363.9bn) under the industrial transformation
announced up to 2026, sustainable investments, and the green stimulus for
transport.
On an annual basis between 2022 and 2050, the required investment for transition in
Germany works out at $130.9bn each year. The German government has committed
$11.1bn per year in public funds to clean projects since January 2020,32 while the
average investment in clean energy generation (private and public) in Germany
between 2015 and 2020 was $30.0bn per year.33 These figures suggest that a
significant investment gap remains that will need to be closed if Germany is to
achieve a just transition compatible with global temperature increases being limited
to 1.5°C. The required annual investment to reduce Germany’s energy-related CO2
emissions to zero is 11.7 times the amount of public funding committed to clean
projects each year since 2020, or 4.4 times the total amount invested in clean energy
generation in the German economy each year (2015-2020).
There is some scope for redirecting existing fossil fuel investments into the
investment needed for emissions reduction. Private investment in fossil fuels in
Germany averaged $2.8bn per annum between 2015 and 2021.34 The German
government has committed $27.1bn in public funds to support fossil-intensive
activities since January 2020, including bailouts for airlines and support for the
automotive industry and coal power generation, among other expenditures.35 Using
regulation and public spending to reduce these financial flows into fossil fuels would
help to mitigate further environmental breakdown and speed the transition to a more
energy-efficient economy.
Germany imported $100.2bn per year in fossil fuels between 2015 and 2021, with
17.2% of this total coming from Russia.36 In this way, Germany’s existing expenditure
on fossil fuels may also be providing funding for the devastating ongoing war
following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, adding further impetus to increase the
pace of decarbonisation in the German economy.
A comparison of the estimated investment required for transition with the actual investment
occurring in recent years in related sectors gives some illustration of the investment gap that
remains. We estimate that for the G7 countries, the investment each year between now and
2050 is many times higher than the public funding committed to clean projects per year since
2020 (Figure 7). For the USA, the largest of the G7 economies, the required investment
each year until 2050 for transition is 31 times the amount of public funds committed
10The Climate Investment Gap of G7 Countries
between January 2020 and May 2022. The ratio of annual investment required for
transition (2022-2050) to public funds committed per annum to clean projects (since 2020) is
estimated at 45 times for Japan, 22 times for France, 12 times for Germany, 5 times for
the UK and 2 times for Canada.
Figure 7: Ratio of required annual investment for transition (2022-2050) and annual public
funds committed to clean projects (2020-2022) for the G7 countries37
50.0
45.4
45.0
40.0
35.0
30.9
30.0
25.0 22.4
20.0
15.0 11.7
10.0 7.7
5.2
5.0 2.3
0.0
Canada UK Italy Germany France USA Japan
Public funding is just one component of the total investment that will be needed for transition:
private investment in transition will also need to increase. A comparison of the estimated
annual investment required for transition across all economic sectors (2022-2050), with the
actual annual investment that has occurred in clean energy generation in recent years (2015
to 2020) in the G7 countries, can give us some indication of the investment gap from a
private sector perspective (Figure 8). It should be noted that private investment between now
and 2050 will need to extend beyond just power generation to other sectors if a just
transition is to be achieved, meaning that this comparison is just one illustration of the scale
of the investment gap.
This gap is highest in Italy (required annual investment for transition is 169 times the
amount that was invested in clean energy generation between 2015 and 2020), primarily due
to the relatively low amount of investment in clean energy generation occurring in recent
years (Figure 6). The gap is relatively larger in the USA (where required investment is 38
times what was recently invested in clean energy generation), Canada (30 times) and
Japan (17 times). The gap in the UK (5 times), France (5 times) and Germany (4 times) is
smaller than in other G7 countries but still significant.
11The Climate Investment Gap of G7 Countries
Figure 8: Ratio of required annual investment for transition (2022-2050) and annual public
and private investment in clean energy generation projects (2015-2020) for the G7
countries38
180.0 169.2
160.0
140.0
120.0
100.0
80.0
60.0
38.2
40.0 29.9
17.2
20.0
4.4 5.0 5.1
0.0
Germany France UK Japan Canada USA Italy
As the elected leaders of G7 countries convene during the upcoming 48th summit, they have
the opportunity to play a crucial role in the global response to climate change. While the
scale of the investment gap may appear daunting, the largest and most powerful countries
have the financial means, the technology, and the historical obligation to scale up their
ambitions and begin a meaningful transition to a more sustainable economic system.
12The Climate Investment Gap of G7 Countries
ENDNOTES
1 We have used Harmonized System commodity code 27 (fossil fuels) on the Comtrade database to
retrieve data on imports. United Nations. (2022). UN Comtrade Database. Retrieved from
https://comtrade.un.org/data/
2See p15, p29, and pp60-69 of International Energy Agency. (2021). Key World Energy Statistics
2021. Retrieved from https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/52f66a88-0b63-4ad2-94a5-
29d36e864b82/KeyWorldEnergyStatistics2021.pdf
3Energy Information Administration. (2022a). Oil and petroleum products explained: oil imports and
exports. Retrieved from https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-
exports.php
4Energy Information Administration. (2022b). Natural gas explained: natural gas imports and exports.
Retrieved from https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/imports-and-exports.php
5 For evidence of the human rights violations linked to the Saudi Arabian and UAE-led coalition in
Yemen from the UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen, see pp 4–5, pp
7–8 and p 17 of Human Rights Council. (2019). Situation of human rights in Yemen, including
violations and abuses since September 2014. Retrieved from
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/A-HRC-45-CRP.7-en.pdf
6 France, Germany, Italy (averaged from 2015 to 2020) and the UK (averaged from 2015 to 2017 due
to lack of more recent data) we used Eurostat data for net FDI (assets minus liabilities) stock in the
following sectors: 1) extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas and mining support service
activities; 2) manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products. For Canada, data is from Statistics
Canada for the following sectors: 1) oil and gas extraction; 2) petroleum and coal products
manufacturing and 3) support activities for mining, and oil and gas extraction, averaged between 2016
and 2021. For the USA, BEA data on FDI for petroleum activities and coal mining activities were
used, averaged between 2014 and 2019. For Japan, we used OECD FDI data for 2015–2020.
7FDI reflects the lasting interest of an investor from one economy in a business in another economy.
This interest formally exists when 10% or more of the voting power is owned by a direct investor in the
board of directors. Eurostat. (2022). Foreign Direct Investments. Retrieved from
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/economic-globalisation/globalisation-in-business-statistics/foreign-
direct-investments
8 IPCC. (2014). Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III
to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing
Team, R.K. Pachauri, and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp.
9 Data on investment in clean energy projects comes from the BNEF database, reported via
Climatescope. This covers private and public sectors (though is expected to be largely private) and
includes the following assets solar, biomass, geothermal, wave, tidal, wind (>1 MW), hydropower
(between 1MW and 50MW) and biofuel projects (>1 million litre capacity per year). Ajadi, T., Cuming,
V., Boyle, R., Strahan, D., Kimmel, M., Logan, M., & McCrone, A. (2020). Global trends in renewable
energy investment 2020. Retrieved from https://www.fs-unep-centre.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/GTR_2020.pdf
10 Eurostat provides data for Italy, France, Germany and the UK from 2015 to 2020 in five activities: 1)
mining of coal and lignite, 2) extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas, 3) support activities for
petroleum and natural gas extraction, 4) manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products, and 5)
manufacture of gas and distribution of gaseous fuels through mains. The data has some missing data
points for specific years. For the USA, the BEA has data on total investment in private non-residential
fixed assets, which includes investment in infrastructure, equipment, and intellectual property
products. This report includes data from 2014 to 2019 in three activities: 1) oil and gas extraction, 2)
13The Climate Investment Gap of G7 Countries
petroleum and coal products, and 3) pipeline transportation. For Canada, Statistics Canada provides
data on the stock of fixed non-residential capital, which includes non-residential building, engineering
construction, machinery and equipment cost, and intellectual property products. This report uses data
from 2016 to 2020 in four activities: 1) conventional oil and gas extraction, 2) non-conventional oil
extraction, 3) support activities for mining and oil and gas extraction, and 4) petroleum and coal
products manufacturing. Note: Data for domestic fossil fuel investment in Japan was not available.
11 Data on investment in clean energy (averaged between 2015 and 2020). Climatescope, (2022).
Climatescope 2021│Geography comparison. Retrieved from https://global-
climatescope.org/tools/geography-comparison/
12Data for public funds committed to clean energy includes energy efficiency improvements, such as
retrofit, smart grid technology, investment in active transport, public transport and electric vehicles,
renewable energy generation from solar, wind, hydropower, rain, tides, geothermal, green hydrogen
(and hydrogen from mixed but predominantly clean sources) and biofuels, biomass and biogas with a
proven minimum negative impact on the environment (sometimes referred to as “advanced” or
“second” or “third-generation”). International Institute for Sustainable Development. (2022). Energy
Policy Tracker. Retrieved from https://www.energypolicytracker.org/
13These different metrics have been kept separate as there is potential for limited overlap between
sources, for example, some public investments in renewables generation may be covered by both the
Energy Policy Tracker and Climatescope in 2020 or 2021.
14 This covers projects supporting fossil fuel production or consumption (eg fossil fuel power
generation, bailouts of airlines and car companies, or construction of highways) as determined by the
IISD Energy Policy Tracker.
15This covers projects supporting clean energy (eg renewable power generation) and low-carbon
activities (eg active travel and public transport, retrofit) as determined by the IISD Energy Policy
Tracker.
16 International Institute for Sustainable Development. (2022). Energy Policy Tracker. Retrieved from
https://www.energypolicytracker.org/. ‘Other energy commitments’ in the IISD Energy Policy Tracker
refers to energy generation from sources that are neither clean nor fossil fuels (eg nuclear,
incineration, certain forms of biomass and hydrogen) or policies that support both fossil fuels and
clean energy simultaneously.
17The cost estimates were adjusted wherever the data allowed the removal of power generation from
nuclear sources, biomass other than residual supplies, and gas with carbon capture and storage.
18Sterchele, P., Brandes, J., Heilig, J., Wrede, D., Kost, C.,... & Henning, H. M. (2020). Paths to a
Climate-neutral Energy System. Tech. rep. Freiburg, Germany: Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy
Systems ISE. Retrieved from https://www.ise.fraunhofer.de/en/publications/studies/paths-to-a-climate-
neutral-energy-system.html
19Dufrêne, N., Kerlero de Rosbo, G., & Nicol, C. (2022). 2% pour 2 degrés: Les investissements
publics et privés nécessaires pour atteindre la neutralité carbone de la France en 2050. [2% for 2
degrees: The public and private investment necessary to achieve carbon neutrality in France by
2050]. Retrieved from https://institut-rousseau.fr/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/rapport-neutralite-
carbone-institut-rousseau.pdf
20 RTE. (2022). Futurs Énergétiques 2050. [Energy futures 2050]. Figure 11.37. Retrieved from
https://assets.rte-france.com/prod/public/2022-
02/BP50_Principaux%20re%CC%81sultats_fev2022_Chap11_analyse%20economique.pdf
21 Noera, M., Grazia Variato, A. M., Agnelli, G., Camisana, E., Di Stefano, A., … & Vite, C. (2020). Il
Green Deal conviene. Benefici per economia e lavoro in Italia al 2030. Retrieved from
https://www.italiaclima.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Il-Green-Deal-conviene-Italian-Climate-
Network.pdf; English translation: https://assesta.it/new-site/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/The-Green-
Deal-is-Advantageous-ICN-ESta-2021-1.pdf
14The Climate Investment Gap of G7 Countries
22 Teske, S., Morris, T., & Nagrath, K. (2020). 100% renewable energy: An Energy [R]evolution for
ITALY. Report prepared by ISF for Greenpeace Italy, June 2020. Retrieved from
https://www.uts.edu.au/sites/default/files/article/downloads/100-Percent-Renewable-Energy-Italy-
report.pdf
23 Climate Change Committee. (2021). The 6th Carbon Budget Dataset. Retrieved from
https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/sixth-carbon-budget/#supporting-information-charts-and-data
24Larson, E., Greig, C., Jenkins, J., Mayfield, E., Pascale, A., … & Swan, A. (2021). Net-Zero
America: Potential pathways, infrastructure, and impacts, Final report. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University. Retrieved from https://netzeroamerica.princeton.edu/
25Martin, S. & Riordan, R. (2020). Capital mobilization plan for a Canadian low-carbon economy.
Retrieved from https://smith.queensu.ca/centres/isf/pdfs/ISF-CapitalMobilizationPlan.pdf
26 Kuwabara, T., Mohr, D., Sauer, B., & Yamada, Y. (2021). How Japan could
reach carbon neutrality by 2050 and why it must start now. Retrieved from
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/how-japan-could-reach-
carbon-neutrality-by-2050
27 Examples of this reduction in operating costs include the lower maintenance costs of electrified
transport relative to combustion engines and the reduced heating costs of buildings that are better
insulated.
28For this reason, the estimates of total required investment for transition in Canada are necessarily
less precise than for the other G7 countries and should be interpreted with caution.
29 For sources for this chart see endnotes 10, 11, and 12, and Table 1.
30Sterchele, P., Brandes, J., Heilig, J., Wrede, D., Kost, C.,... & Henning, H. M. (2020). Paths to a
Climate-neutral Energy System. Tech. rep. Freiburg, Germany: Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy
Systems ISE. Retrieved from https://www.ise.fraunhofer.de/en/publications/studies/paths-to-a-climate-
neutral-energy-system.html
31Applying the average exchange rate for 2020 calendar year to the original cost estimate of
€3,330bn.
32 International Institute for Sustainable Development. (2022). Energy Policy Tracker. Retrieved from
https://www.energypolicytracker.org/
33 Data on investment in clean energy (averaged between 2015 and 2020). Climatescope, (2022).
Climatescope 2021│Geography comparison. Retrieved from https://global-
climatescope.org/tools/geography-comparison/
34 Eurostat provides data for investment from 2015 to 2020 in five activities: 1) mining of coal and
lignite, 2) extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas, 3) support activities for petroleum and natural
gas extraction, 4) manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products, and 5) manufacture of gas
and distribution of gaseous fuels through mains. The data has some missing data points for specific
years.
35 International Institute for Sustainable Development. (2022). Energy Policy Tracker. Retrieved from
https://www.energypolicytracker.org/
36 We have used Harmonized System commodity code 27 (fossil fuels) on the Comtrade database to
retrieve data on imports. United Nations. (2022). UN Comtrade Database. Retrieved from
https://comtrade.un.org/data/
37 For sources for this chart see endnote 12 and Table 1.
38 For sources for this chart see endnotes 11 and Table 1.
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